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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The trial court entered its Ruling and Order denying Emmanuel Nuno's ("Father") 
Rule 59 Motion to Amend Order on April 30, 2015. Rec. 499. Father timely filed his Notice 
of Appeal on May 21, 2015. Rec. 522. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code 
§ 78A-4-l 03(2)(h). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Issue: Did Judge Christine Johnson err in treating the "recommendation" of 
District Court Judge Samuel Mc Vey, who was sitting as a substitute domestic relations 
commissioner, dismissing this case for lack of jurisdiction, as a final order, not subject to 
objection or review pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. I 08? 
a. Standard of Review. The Court reviews a trial court's resolution of 
a party's objection to the recommendation of a commissioner as a matter oflaw. The Court 
reviews conclusions oflaw for correctness. Dent v. Dent, 870 P.2d 280,282 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994). The Court reviews subsidiary determinations necessary to that resolution according 
to the standard appropriate to the issue. Gullickson v. Gullickson, 2013 UT App 83, ii 14,301 
P .3d IO 11, 1017. "Both jurisdictional questions and questions of statutory interpretation are 
questions of law that we review for correctness." R. B. v. State (State ex rel. P.F.B.), 2008 
UT App 271,110, 191 P.3d 49, 51. 
b. Preservation Below. Father contended throughout the proceeding that 
Judge Mc Vey clearly appeared as a substitute domestic relations commissioner in this matter 
and that Judge McVey represented, and the parties believed, that any recommendation of 
Judge Mc Vey would be subject to objection and review by Judge Christine Johnson. R. 430, 
432 and 481. 6 
2. Issue: Did the trial court err in holding that the father had failed to raise the 
issue of his standing and the constitutionality of the Utah Uniform Parentage Act (Utah Code 
§ § 78B-15-10 I, et seq. (2008) ), in Father's Amended Petition and in his response to 
Respondent Kimberly Hart Lane's ("Mother") motion to dismiss? 
a. Standard of Review. To preserve a substantive issue for appeal, a 
party must first raise the issue before the trial court. See West One Bank, Utah v. Life Ins. 
Co., 887 P.2d 880, 882 n.l (Utah Ct. App. 1994). "A matter is sufficiently raised if it is 
submitted to the trial court, and the court is afforded an opportunity to rule on the issue." 
State v. Starnes, 841 P .2d 712, 716 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) ( citation omitted and internal 
quotation marks omitted). The Court reviews a district court's interpretation of a statute for 
correctness. Peck v. State, 2008 UT 39, ii 7, 191 P .3d 4, 6. The Court reviews a district 
court's findings of fact under a clearly erroneous standard, Glew v. Ohio Sav. Bank, 2007 UT 
56, ~ 18, 181 P.3d 791, 795, and reviews a district court's ruling regarding a statute's 
constitutionality for correctness. T.S. v. L.F. (In Re S.L.F.), 2001 UT App 183, ~ 9, 27 P.3d 
583, 585; H. U.F. v. W.P. W, 2009 UT 10, ii 9, 203 P.3d 943, 949. 
b. Preservation Below. Father properly raised the issue of his standing 
and the constitutionality of the Utah Uniform Parentage Act (Utah Code § 78B-15-10 I). 
Rec. 120, 137-38, 309, 315, 432 and 439. 
2 
Q 
3. Issue: Do the provisions of the Utah Uniform Parentage Act (Utah Code § 
78B-15-101. et seq.) (2008), as applied to the facts of this case, violate the due process 
provisions of the Utah and United States Constitutions? 
a. Standard of Review. The test for whether the provisions of the Utah 
Unifonn Parentage Act excluding a father, as a person who can challenge paternity, pass due 
process muster is whether the Act gives him a meaningful and adequate procedure to protect 
his parental rights R. C.S. v. A. O.L. (In re Adoption of Baby Girl T.), 2012 UT 78, 120, 291 
P.3d 215; Bolden v. Doe (In reJ.S.), 2014 UT 51,120, cert. denied, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 5403. 
The Court reviews a district court's ruling regarding a statute's constitutionality for 
correctness. T.S. v. L.F. (In Re S.L.F.), 2001 UT App 183, 19, 27 P.3d 583,585; H.U.F. v. 
W.P. W., 2009 UT 10, 19, 203 P.3d 943, 949. 
b. Preservation Below. Father raised his constitutional arguments in his 
petition, R. 309,315, and in his memorandum in opposition to the motion to dismiss. R. 120. 
See also Rec. 1, 120, 137-38, 142, 309,315,432 and 439. 
4. Issue: Did the court commit error in failing to allow Father to conduct 
discovery related to the allegations in the Amended Petition in accordance with Utah R. Civ. 
P. 56(f)? 
a. Standard of Review. "The Court reviews the denial of a rule 56(f) 
motion for an abuse of discretion." Aspenwood, L.L. C. v. C.A. T, L.L. C., 2003 UT App 28, 
1 16, 73 P.3d 947, 951, cert. denied, 72 P.3d 685 (Utah 2003). However, when a trial court 
does not rule on a rule 56(f) motion, thereby failing to exercise its discretion,"'the issue of 
3 
whether or not it should have presents a legal question which is subject to de nova review."' 
Crossland Sav. v. Hatch, 877 P.2d 1241, 1243 n.4 (Utah 1994) (quoting Garrett v. City & ~ 
County of San Francisco, 818 F.2d 1515, 1518 n.3 (9th Cir. 1987)). 
b. Preservation Below. Father specifically asked for a order allowing him 
to conduct discovery relative to the allegations contained in the Amended Petition and filed 
a Rule 56(£) affidavit in support thereof. R. 120, 240, 309, 397, 430 and 432. 
5. Issue: Did the court err in failing to make sufficient findings of fact to 
support its conclusion that the provisions of Utah Unifonn Parentage Act precluded the 
exercise of jurisdiction in this matter? 
a. Standard of Review. For findings of fact to be adequate, they "must 
show that the court's judgment or decree follows logically from, and is supported by, the 
evidence. The findings should be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts 
to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached." 
Acton v. Deli ran, 73 7 P .2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987) ( citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted). "Only if it is clear that the claimant is not entitled to relief under any state of facts 
that could be proven to support the claim should a motion to dismiss be granted." Buckner G 
v. Kennard, 2004 UT 78, ii 9, 99 P.3d 842, 846 (citation omitted). 
b. Preservation Below. Father argued throughout the proceeding that the 
Mother's misrepresentation of her marital status and other misconduct resulting in the 
bonding between Father and the children worked to provide a basis under which the 
4 
provisions of the Utah Uniform Parentage Act would be unenforceable. Rec. 1, 120, 142, 
309, 382, 430 and 432. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW 
Utah Code § 78B-15-602, "Standing to maintain proceeding," and § 78B-15-607, 
"Limitation - Child having presumed father," are set forth in the appendix. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case & Course of the Proceedings Below 
Father commenced this action seeking orders related to the determination of 
parentage, custody, parent time, child support and other relief relating to two children he 
fathered with the mother, Kimberly Hart Lane: G .L.H., born 8/23/2012, and H.H., born 
12/4/2013. 
Father's petition was filed on July 18, 2014 in the Fifth District Court for Washington 
County, Utah. R. 1. At the same time, Father made a motion for an expedited hearing to 
address his motion for temporary orders. R. 30, 46, 51, 58. On August 22, 2014, Judge 
Ludlow determined that since Mother and the children had moved to Utah County, the case 
should be transferred to the F om1h District Court and an order of transfer was executed. R. 
89, 94, 107. 
On September 23, 2014, Mother filed a motion to dismiss the petition based upon the 
Utah Parentage Act (Utah Code§ 75B-13-101, et seq. (2008)). R. 109, 111. On October 7, 
2014, Father filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion to dismiss supp011ed by an 
extensive affidavit from Father. R. 120, 142. Father's counsel requested, also by affidavit, 
5 
the right pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 56{f), to undertake discovery to help resolve the factual 
issues raised by Mother's response to the petition. R. 240. On October 31, 2014, Mother ~ 
filed a reply memorandum in support of her motion to dismiss. R. 288. 
On October 7, 2014, Father filed a motion to add, as an indispensable party, 
Mother's current husband, Brian J. Hart ("Husband"). R. 244,246. Affidavits of Mother and 
Husband were filed on October 30, 2014. R. 266, 276. On November 12, 2014, 
Commissioner Patton granted Father's motion to add Husband as a party and continued the 
date for hearing on the motion to dismiss. R. 307. 
Father filed and served an Amended Verified Petition on December 5, 2014. R. 309. 
Mother answered the Amended Verified Petition on December 18, 2014. R. 34 7. Husband 
filed his answer on January 9, 2015. R. 358. 
On January 22, 2015, Judge Samuel Mc Vey, who was asked just a couple of hours 
before the scheduled hearing on Mother's motion to dismiss to sit in for an ailing 
Commissioner Patton, took the bench, as he himself described, as a substitute domestic 
relations commissioner. After hearing argument, Judge Mc Vey rendered what he termed 
a "recommendation" to Judge Johnson (to whom the case was assigned), granting Mother's ~ 
motion to dismiss. R. 3 72, 432. The Amended Order from that hearing was not entered until 
May 6, 2015. R. 513 (Addendum A). 
A transcript of the relevant p011ion of the hearing in front of Judge Mc Vey reveals 
that Judge Mcvey in fact advised the parties that he was sitting as a domestic relations 
6 
commissioner and asked the permission of the parties to proceed. R. 432. The transcript of 
the hearing, in relevant part, states: 
J: . . . I'm not saying there aren't some mechanisms so you can get that 
back in this case. It may be or you could go before Judge Johnson on that. 
This is a recommendation because I am sitting as a Commissioner. I am 
going to recommend that the case be dismissed for lack of standing under 
the uniform parentage act. That would be the ruling. 
Petersen: Just to clarify, do you indicate that you are sitting as a 
commissioner? 
J: That is correct. I just found out about this a couple of hours ago. I 
am not willing at this point to go beyond that. I am basically covering 
Commissioner Patton's calendar today. 
Yaiko: Just to clarify that means that he can object? 
J: As far as I know. I'm not the expert on the Commissioner's procedures, 
but as far as I know, he can object. That's the order of the court until it's 
changed by someone else. He can go to Judge Johnson and have her take 
another bite at the apple here but I don't know that she may or may not 
agree with me you would have to see. So that will be the ruling of the court. 
Would you prepare an order to that effect? (Emphasis added) 
R. 449-450 (Addendum B). 
Father filed an Objection to the Recommendation on January 30, 2015 with supporting 
memorandum. R. 379,382. Father filed a notice of his constitutional challenge to the Utah 
Parentage Act on January 30, 2015. R. 397. Mother and Husband filed a response to Father 
's objection on February 25, 2015. R. 410. On February 25, 2015, Father requested a full 
hearing on his objection to the recommendation in front of Judge Johnson. R. 406. 
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On March 4, 2015, Judge Christine Johnson, without arguments or a hearing, entered 
a Ruling and Order denying Father's objection on the grounds that Judge Mc Vey sat as a Cr) 
district court judge and that no objection therefrom was allowed by the rules. R. 427 
(Addendum C). 
On March 11, 2015, Father filed a rule 52 and 59 motion to amend the judgment. R. 
430, 432. Mother and Husband filed a response on April 22, 2015. R. 467. On April 29, 
2015 Father filed a motion to strike the response to the motion to amend judgment as being 
filed out of time. R. 475,477. Also on April 29, 2015, Father filed a reply memorandum in 
support of his motion. R. 481. On April 30, 2015, without argument or hearing, Judge G;; 
Johnson denied the motion. R. 513 (Addendum D). 
Father thereafter perfected his appeal on May 21, 2015. R. 522. 
B. Statement of Facts 
Father first met Mother, who, at the time, went by the name of Kimberly Lane in 
approximately April 2011. Both Mother and Father were residing in St. George, Utah. 
Mother was working at Denny's restaurant and Father was managing a restaurant known as 
Casa Dona Maria. The parties became friends. After a few months, Mother left Denny's and Q 
went to work at Casa Dona Maria where Father was the manager. Mother worked at the 
restaurant for a few months, during which time the relationship between the two intensified. 
R. 142. 
Mother ultimately left her employment at Casa Dona Maria and went back to work 
at Denny's. It is at that time the parties began to formally date. Mother explicitly 
8 
represented to Father that she was married but separated and in the process of finalizing her 
divorce. Id. Mother had two children at the time (fathered by her then husband, respondent 
Brian Hart), K.H. born December 2008 and D.B.H. born December 2009. Id. See R. 165. 
Father and Mother moved in together in approximately July-August 2011. They 
resided in an apartment in the Valley View area of St George, Utah. The lease to the 
apartment was in Mother's name. At this time Mother again represented to Father that she 
was separated from Husband, was in the middle of a divorce that would be finalized soon. 
R. 142. It was during this time that Mother became pregnant with Father's child, 
G .L.H.(bom 8/23/2012). 1 Id. See also R. 266. 
Father and Mother continued to reside together but after a period of time they gave 
up the apartment and Mother moved in with her sister for a short time. Father and Mother 
talked frequently about their prospective marriage. Id. Shortly before the birth of G.L.H. on 
August 23, 2012, Mother told Father that she was going back to Utah County with her 
parents for approximately two weeks. Id. She then moved back to St. George and lived with 
her sister for a short period of time. Id. 
While Mother was pregnant with Father's child, Mother showed Father the Decree 
of Divorce from Respondent Brian Hart that was dated March 26 2012. R. 142, 164. The 
Decree does not mention that Mother was pregnant. Id. From the time the Decree was 
entered in March 2012, Mother repeatedly represented to Father that she considered them a 
1 Although the evidence produced by Mother during the adjudication of the motion to 
dismiss indicates that the child's last name has always been "Hai1," Mother represented to 
Father that the child's last name was "Lane." R 142. 
9 
couple and family. R. 142. Mother never disclosed to Father and Father did not otherwise 
became aware that Mother was continuing to see or have contact with her ex-husband, Brian 
Hart. Id. Father did not know, until it was disclosed in these proceedings, that Mother 
surreptitiously remarried Respondent Brian Hart on August 22, 2012 (R. 276), one day prior 
to her delivery of G.L.H, fathered by Petitioner. R. 266, 276, 142. Father was simply 
shocked to discover her allegation in these proceedings that she had any kind of on-going 
relationship with Husband and had remarried Mr. Hart. R. 142. Father alleges that, in fact, 
there is no real relationship between Mother and Husband and that the marriage is a sham 
and without any substance. Father contends that Mother and Husband did not live together ~ 
as husband and wife after the re-marriage and that Husband did not parent the children he 
had with Mother. Id. 
Father and Mother again moved in together on October 27, 2012 and lived in a house 
at 64 South 2790 East Circle, St. George, Utah. Father remained ignorant of the fact that 
Mother had remarried Mr. Hart. Mother never told Father she had remarried or had any kind 
of on-going relationship with Husband. Id. Father and Mother (using her maiden name, 
"Lane") both signed a Residential Lease Agreement (R. 142, 152). The lease is dated Q 
October 27, 2012 and was for a tenn of one year. It is to be noted that the Residential Lease 
Agreement refers to Mother's two other children with Husband, Brian Hart and "Grant - 2 
mos," fathered by Petitioner, Mr. Nuno. Id. 
10 
Father and Mother continued to live as a couple. The parties obtained DISH satellite 
service for the apartment they were residing in and contracted with National Satellite 
Warehouse, Inc. for a satellite dish. R. 142. 
Father provided overwhelming evidence that he and Mother lived together as a family 
and that he was allowed to father and bond with his son G.L.H. Id. Father provided 
photographs with his son taken at the parties' home, Father's work and the like. Mother 
would take photographs of Father with the child and give the photographs to Father. Id. 
Mother provided Father with pictures from the day that G .L.H. was born, together with a 
chart from the hospital showing the date and time G .L.H. was born. Id. 
Father, Mother and G .L.H., shortly after they moved into the apartment in St. George 
in October, 2012, went boating together at Sand Hollow, Utah, and pictures were taken. 
Father produced photographs of Father, Mother and G .L.H. taken during this time period. Id. 
One of the collages put together by Mother and given to Father contained the following 
writing, "The couples that are meant to be are the ones who go through everything that's 
designed to tear them apart and come out even stronger." R. 142, 184. 
Father has an album of pictures of himself, Mother and G.L.H. that was made by 
Mother and given to him. R. 142, 186. Part of the picture album are numerous photographs 
establishing the bonding of Father with the child. Id. On Father's Day 2013, Mother gave 
Father a card on which she wrote on behalf of the infant, "you are the best dad in the world, 
our rock and our hero .... thank you for loving me so much for playing with me and making 
me the center of your world .... I'm as lucky as can be, the best daddy in the world belongs 
11 
to me, love Grant." R. 142, 194. At this point in time Father and Mother were expecting their 
second child, H.H., born December 4, 2013. R. 142,275. 
During this same period of time, Mother would give Father random notes. One note 
provided by Father states, "babes, I love you! Forever and always! For the rest of my life. My 
one and only.-Kim." R. 142, 196. Father continued to father and bond with G.L.H. on a 
daily basis. The parties had a birthday party for G.L.H. when he was one year old in August, 
2013. A picture was taken of Mother, Father and the child and provided to the court. R. 142, 
197. 
It was in the fall of 2013 that Mother told Father that she needed a break and she Q 
moved back to Utah County with her parents. Id. The parties' second son, H.H., was born 
on December 4, 2013. Again Mother kept Father abreast of the events relating to the birth 
and sent numerous photographs of Mother and the parties' two children. R. 142,200. Father 
also provided a photograph taken by Mother of him and the newborn, H.H. R. 142, 201. 
After the birth of the child, Mother then returned to St. George and lived with Father, 
with the parties' children, in the apartment they rented at 64 S. 2790 E. Circle, St. George. 
R. 142, 152. Mother and Father continued to live in this apartment until June, 2014 when G; 
Mother abruptly moved out. R. 142. Prior to Mother's abruptly moving out in June, 2013, she 
entered into a contract with St. George Golds Gym. R. 142. Likewise, the parties were 
residing together on Father's Day 2014, when Mother gave Father a Father's Day card signed 
"Grant, Hollis and Momma." R. 142,207. Mother actually had G.L.H scribble on the card. 
The card is dated June 15,2014. The envelope that it came in states, "P.S. You 're "Flippin" 
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Awesome Dad!" There was also an accompanying note, which states, "Babes, I just want 
to tell you how much I love you. You mean the world to me. I will love you every day of 
my life for the rest of my life. Kim." R. 142, 206. 
In the spring of 2014, Father and Mother, with the children, went to Disneyland in 
California twice. Father produced photographs of the trips including a picture of Father, 
Mother and their sons, G.L.H and H.H. Father produced other photographic evidence of his 
ongoing fathering of and bonding with the minor children. R. 142, 214. There are 
photographs of Father with the children in their St. George apartment and a photograph of 
Father feeding H.H. Father has hundreds of photographs memorializing the daily life and 
interaction of Father with the children. R. 142, 215, 216, 218, 221, 223, 224. 
Father saw his children on September 16, 2014. He had made arrangements with 
Mother to see the children. Father came to Provo, Utah, and he and Mother stayed together 
in the same room with their two children. The family went to Chuck E. Cheese to eat and 
Father provided photographs of the visit. R. 142. During the time that the parties spent 
together in the motel in September, 2014, they had sexual relations. Mother told Father that 
the only reason that she was disputing Father's claim for paternity and visitation was under 
the advice of her attorney. Mother told Father that she was not living with Brian Hart. Id. 
Father has been visiting with the two minor children since he filed the paternity action 
on July 18, 2014. R. 142. For instance, since Father filed the petition in St. George, Mother 
and the children came to St. George for approximately one week. Mother stayed with Father 
at the house that they rented together. During this time, Mother and Father carried on nonnal 
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relations. The parties had meals together, visited Father's brother where they rode ATVs 
together. During this period of time, Mother represented to Father that they were going to 
get back together. Numerous family members and friends observed the parties and children 
together. R. 142. 
Father has supported Mother and paid support for the minor children. Id. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Father began his relationship with Mother based upon her representation that although 
she was married, she was not only separated from Husband but close to finalizing a divorce. 
Father and Mother accordingly moved in together and Mother became pregnant with the W 
parties first G.L.H., born on August 23, 2012. Mother provided Father with a copy of her 
divorce decree from Husband, dated March 26, 2012. Mother represented to Father that she 
had no on-going relationship with her then ex-husband and that she considered Father and 
the children to be her family. Mother continued to live with Father, with her two children 
(from her prior marriage). Then, Mother, one day before she gave birth to G.L.H 
(Father's first child), remarried her ex-husband. Mother not only did not disclose to 
Father that she was getting remarried, Mother did not advise Father that she had any kind of ~ 
on-going relationship with her ex-husband, before or after the alleged re-marriage. 
After the birth of G.L.H., Mother moved back in with Father and they continued their 
relationship and Father assumed parental responsibilities with his infant son. The 
relationship continued to flourish and Mother and Father conceived their second child, H.H. 
born 12/4/2013. During the entire period from March 26, 2012 (the date of Mother's divorce 
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decree) through the birth of the second child up and including the date this action was 
commenced, Mother hid the fact that she had remarried her ex-husband. During that same 
time period, Mother had no relationship with her now husband and did not live with him. 
Father functioned as Mother's partner and the Father of his two children during the entire 
period. Father has developed and nourished a long term and deep bond with the children and 
has assumed the role as their father. Husband has simply not had any significant contact with 
Father's two children with Mother. 
When this action was filed, Mother disclosed the fact that she had remarried her ex-
husband and claimed that her re-marriage predated the birth of the two children. Mother 
argued that under the UUP A, Husband was the presumed father of the children and that 
Father did not have a right to challenge that status under section 607 of the UUPA. Father 
confronted with the disclosure that there might of been a re-marriage, filed a comprehensive 
memorandum in opposition to the motion coupled with extensive affidavits of Father and his 
counsel outlining the need for further discovery and that Mother and Husband had 
misrepresented Mother's marital status, had lied about the re-marriage and had led Father to 
believe he was living with a single women, with who he had two children. Father in reliance 
on the misrepresentations, committed himself in fathering the two children and developing 
the deep bond associated therewith. 
Father contends first, that Judge Mc Vey, in filling in for an ailing domestic 
commissioner, explicitly represented to the parties that he was acting as a commissioner and 
that whatever he decided by way of a recommendation would be subject to the parties' rights 
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to object as allowed by the rules. After Judge Mc Vey recommended that the motion to 
dismiss be granted, Father objected, requested a full hearing with the tight to call witnesses ~ 
and introduce evidence. Judge Johnson denied the objection ruling that Judge McVey's 
recommendation was a final order from which no objection could be made. Father contends 
that the inability to object and obtain a hearing and introduce evidence and call witnesses 
violated the rules controlling the process and deprived him of his due process rights. 
Secondly, Father contends that the court should have assumed, for purposes of 
adjudicating the motion to dismiss, that the facts set out in the Amended Petition and 
affidavits were established and in addition, allow all reasonable inferences that would 
support Father's opposition to the motion to dismiss. Those facts establish the tortious 
misconduct of Mother and Husband in misrepresenting the Mother's martial status to Father. 
Those same facts establish Father's justifiable reliance on the misrepresentations, in fathering 
the two children and assuming the paternal duties relating thereto that resulted in a deep and 
long terms relationship with the children. 
Third, contrary to the holding of the court, Father did adequately allege the facts and 
legal theories in the Amended Verified Petition and in his memorandum in opposition to the 
motion to dismiss and affidavits of Father and his counsel, to support his claims related to 
Father's standing under the UUPA and the unconstitutionality of the UUPA as applied to 
the facts of this case, under the due process provisions of the Utah and U.S. Constitutions. 
Further, any deficiency in detailing specific facts and claims is excused based upon Mother's 
revelation of the re-marriage that she had misrepresented for years and the court's failure to 
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allow Father the right to conduct further discovery before hearing the motion pursuant to rule 
56(t). 
Fourth, Father has established a prima facie case showing that he in fact has standing 
to maintain this action under the UUPA and that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to 
the facts of this case under the due process provisions of the Utah and United States 
Constitutions. 
Accordingly, the order of the lower court should be reversed. 
I: 
ARGUMENT 
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN REFUSING TO 
ALLOW FATHER'S OBJECTION TO THE 
RECOMMENDATION MADE ON RESPONDENTS' MOTION 
TO DISMISS. 
Before discussing the merits of whether the court's dismissal of the Amended Petition 
under Utah's Parentage Act was appropriate, it is important to review Father's claim of 
procedural defects in the adjudication process of the motion to dismiss that deprived Father 
of the right to accumulate and present all the relevant evidence before a tribunal authorized 
by statue to make a final detennination. 
Specifically, Judge Samuel McVey, appearing on short notice and filling in for an 
ailing domestic relations commissioner, considered himself to be acting in the capacity of a 
commissioner and so represented the same to the parties and their counsel. The parties, who 
relied on Judge McVey's representations, proceeded to argue the Respondents' motion to 
dismiss, as if the proceeding was before a commissioner. Father explicitly relied on the fact 
that the proceeding was subject to the filing of an objection and a full hearing on the merits 
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in front of the judge assigned to the case, Judge Johnson. Accordingly, Father did not call 
witnesses, introduce evidence, continue to press his request for a continuance to conduct 
discovery or otherwise proceed as if the matter was being conducted by the judge assigned 
to the case in the context of a dispositive hearing. Importantly, Judge McVey in his 
consideration of the issue, explicitly relied upon the fact that his recommendation would be 
subject to the assigned judge's review and that the parties would have the right to supplement 
their record. 
The court's determination that Judge McVey's recommendation was not subject to 
objection denied Father basic procedural due process. 
A. The Material Facts Relevant to Judge Mc Vey Sitting as a 
Commissioner are not in Dispute. 
Judge Johnson, in the Ruling and Order on Petitioner's Objection to Commissioner's 
Recommendations dated March 4, 2015 (R. 427, Addendum C), held that Judge McVey 
heard the Respondents' motion to dismiss as a district court judge and not as a domestic 
relations cmmnissioner. Further, the court assumed that the parties had been so advised and 
had actually given their consent to Judge Mc Vey hearing the matter as a district court judge. 
Based thereon, Judge Johnson concluded that Father did not have the right to file an 
objection to Judge McVey's recommendation pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. I 08 and therefore, 
Father's objection should be denied and the recommendation of Judge Mc Vey be treated as 
a final order, from which only post judgment motions and appeal would apply. Id. \Mm tre 
contents of the minute entry, the transcript of that hearing and the wording of the order are 
reviewed, there is no question that Judge Mc Vey expressly stated that he was sitting in 
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because of Commissioner Patton's illness. R. 372,432,448. Judge Mc Vey clearly stated and 
represented to the parties that he was hearing the matter as a domestic relations 
commissioner and therefore would only be rendering a recommendation which was subject 
to the filing of an objection in accordance with the rules. The transcript, in relevant part, 
states: 
J. ... I'm not saying there aren't some mechanisms so you can get that back 
in this case. It may be or you could go before Judge Johnson on that. This is 
a recommendation because I am sitting as a Commissioner. I am going to 
recommend that the case be dismissed for lack of standing under the uniform 
parentage act. That would be the ruling. 
Petersen: Just to clarify, do you indicate that you are sitting as a 
commissioner? 
J: That is correct. I just found out about this a couple of hours ago. I am not 
willing at this point to go beyond that. I am basically covering Commissioner 
Patton's calendar today. 
Yaiko: Just to clarify that means that he can object? 
J: As far as I know. I'm not the expert on the Commissioner's procedures, but 
as far as I know, he can object. That's the order of the court until it's changed 
by someone else. He can go to Judge Johnson and have her take another bite 
at the apple here but I don't know that she may or may not agree with me you 
would have to see. So that will be the ruling of the court. Would you prepare 
an order to that effect? (Emphasis added) 
R. 449-450 (Addendum C). 
A summary of the same findings as to Judge Mc Vey sitting as a commissioner and 
issuing a recommendation subject to objection and review is contained in the final order. R. 
513 (Addendum A), ii I 0. The facts are clear that Judge Mc Vey assumed he was hearing the 
Respondents' motion to dismiss in the capacity and in the setting established for domestic 
19 
relations commissioners. Judge Mc Vey clearly articulated that position to the parties and 
couched his disposition in terms of a "recommendation." R. 372. The parties justifiably ~ 
relied on Judge Mc Vey' s statements made during the course of the hearing. 
B. Proceedings Before a Commissioner are Abbreviated and Conditioned 
Upon the Right to Object, to Request and Participate in an Evidentiary 
Hearing and to Supplement the Record. 
Domestic relations commissioners are "quasi-judicial officers of the court and have 
limited judicial authority as provided by this section and the rules of the Judicial Council." 
Utah Code § 78A-5-l 07(1 )(a) (2008). The Judicial Council is statutorily charged with 
establishing rules defining the commissioners' duties and authority. Utah Code § 78A-5- G;; 
107(8) (2008). 
Rule 6-401 of the Judicial Council Rules of Judicial Administration authorizes 
commissioners to hear motions in actions in which there are claims related to paternity. Rule 
6-401 ( 1) and (2). Commissioners accordingly have the authority to make recommendations 
to the court regarding any issue, including a recommendation for entry of final judgment. 
Rule 6-401(2)(D). See generally Gullickson v. Gullickson, 2013 UT App 83,301 P.3d 1011. 
However, commissioners are precluded from making final adjudications and serving as pro G 
tempore judges in any matter not authorized by Supreme Court rule. Rule 6-40 I ( 4)(A). Utah 
Code § 30-3-15.3(3) (2015) explicitly states that a commissioner can act as a judge pro 
tempore on a action under the Utah Uniform Parentage Act only if the action is 
"uncontested" or with the written consent of the parties. Because neither condition was met, 
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a commissioner was prohibited from serving as a judge pro tempo re under the circumstances 
of this case. 
Practicing attorneys know that nonnally proceedings before a commissioner are 
abbreviated and motions are submitted with "attachments" consisting of a wide range of 
"records, fonns, information and affidavits." Utah R. Civ. P. IO I. The process employed 
in adjudications made by a commissioner is subject to the right to object to any 
recommendation rendered therein. Utah R. Civ. P. 108 allows a party a right to object to any 
recommendation of a commissioner. The rule allows the judge charged with the case to hold 
a hearing on any objection. It allows a party the right, upon request, 
to present testimony and other evidence on genuine issues of fact relevant to 
custody; and [] to a hearing at which the judge may require testimony or 
proffers of testimony on genuine issues of fact relevant to issues other than 
custody. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 108(d)(3). 
The rule then dictates that, 
[t]he judge will make independent findings of fact and conclusions of law 
based on the evidence, whether by proffer, testimony or exhibit, presented to 
the judge, or, if there was no hearing before the judge, based on the evidence 
presented to the commissioner. 
Utah R. Civ. P. I 08(f). 
As demonstrated below, Judge McVey's perception that he was sitting as a 
commissioner in a setting established for quasi-judicial officers, subject to the right of a party 
to object thereto and obtain a full hearing wherein testimony and evidence could be offered, 
mandates that his disposition of the motion be treated as a "recommendation." Judge Mc Vey 
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did not intend his "recommendation" to be a final order. This mandates that all of the 
procedural and substantive safeguards attendant to the commissioner process be 
allowed-the most fundamental of which is the right to object and to a full hearing resulting 
in findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
C. The Procedural Defects in this Case Constitute a Denial of Due 
Process to the Fat her. 
Father submits that Judge Johnson violated the relevant rules and statutes in refusing ~ 
to review and decide Father's objection to Judge McVey's recommendation. Further, Judge 
Johnson's order violated Father's substantive and procedural due process rights. There are 
two separate and distinct arguments supporting the proposition that Father was denied by 
basic due process. First, Judge Mc Vey thought he was entering an interim or non-final order 
and his thought process in resolving the case was so affected. Judge Mc Vey did not decide 
the motion thinking it was going to be a final order of a district court judge. He thought of 
it as an interim order subject to objection and Judge Johnson's review.2 The mental ~ 
disposition of the judge denied Father the right to a determination made by a judge knowing 
that the same would be a final order and disposition and preparing accordingly. 
Secondly, Father was denied the rights set by statute and rule that are attendant to 
filing an objection such as the right to supplement the record, call witnesses, introduce 
evidence at a hearing, and a determination made on findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
2 A judge's disposition of a Rule 65A motion for a TRO is certainly affected by the 
fact that ultimately there will be a hearing on the merits as to whether the TRO should be 
continued, revoked or amended. Further, a judge's disposition of temporary or interim 
motions is likewise affected by the fact that a full hearing will be held on the matter. 
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In Utah the Due Process Clause has been construed to encompass both a procedural 
and a substantive component. Under the procedural component, the courts have long 
recognized a general right to notice and an opportunity to be heard. See United Student Aid 
Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 272, 130 S. Ct. 1367, 176 L. Ed. 2d 158(201 O); Long 
v. Ethics & Discipline Comm. of the Utah Supreme Court, 2011 UT 32, if 29,256 P.3d 206. 
Thus, for rights the law deems subject to formal process (in courts or other adjudicative 
bodies), due process requires notice reasonably calculated to inform paiiies that their rights 
are in jeopardy and a meaningful opportunity to be heard in the course of such proceedings. 
See Wells v. Children's Aid Soc. of Utah, 681 P.2d 199,204 (Utah 1984) (explaining that 
procedural due process requirements encompass the "notice and opportunity to be heard" that 
"must be observed in order to have a valid proceeding affecting life, liberty, or property"). 
In this case Father was not advised that his rights to a judge who knew he or she was 
entering a final order and the other protections and procedures of the objection process were 
in jeopardy when Judge McVey heard the case. 
Simply, Father had neither a meaningful nor adequate procedure to protect his 
interests and rights as defined by statute and rules of court. R. CS. v. A. O.L. (In re Adoption 
o.f Baby Girl T), 2012 UT 78, ~ 20,291 P.3d 215; Bolden v. Doe (In re J.S.), 2014 UT 51. 
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II: THE COURT WAS OBLIGATED TO ACCEPT, AS 
ESTABLISHED, THE ALLEGATIONS CONTAINED IN THE 
VERIFIED AMENDED PETITION AND SUPPORTING 
AFFIDAVIT AND DRAW ALL SUPPORTING REASONABLE 
INFERENCES THEREFROM IN ADJUDICATING A MOTION 
TO DISMISS. 
A. Summa,y of the Basis of the Court's Ruling and Father's Factual and 
Legal Claims. 
This appeal follows the lower court's granting of a motion to dismiss based upon the 
provisions of the Utah Unifonn Parentage Act, Utah Code §§ 78B-15-101 et seq. (UUPA). 
The court found that Mother and Husband had re-married at the time that both children, 
admittedly fathered by Mr. Nuno, were born. Accordingly, the court found that Husband was ~ 
the statutorily presumed father of both children pursuant to Utah Code§ 78B-15-20 I (2008). 
R. 513 (Addendum A). 
The trial court concluded that although Utah Code § 78B-15-602 arguably allows 
Father standing to initiate a proceeding to adjudicate the parentage of his two children even 
though Mother was married to Husband, the limitations set forth in Utah Code § 78B-15-607 
preclude anyone other than Mother and Husband from doing so. Id. Accordingly, the court 
held that Father had no standing under the UUP A to bring an action to adjudicate parentage ~ 
of the two children and thus dismissed Father's Amended Petition. Id. The court made no 
findings as to the misconduct of the Mother and Husband in representing their status to 
Father-whether the re-marriage between Mother and Husband was a sham and whether there 
was significant bonding between Father and the children. The court did not address the 
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contention of Father that the UUPA was unconstitutional as applied to the facts of this case, 
but held instead that the argument had been waived. 
Father alleged in the Amended Petition and in his un-refuted affidavit that he began 
an intimate relationship with Mother only after she represented that she was separated from 
Husband and was in the process of a divorce that was to be resolved shortly. Consistent with 
her representation, Mother provided Father with a copy of the divorce decree dissolving the 
marriage with Husband, dated March 26, 2012. The decree does not mention that Mother 
was pregnant and expecting a child because Mother and Husband knew the child was 
fathered by Mr. Nuno. R. 1, 120, 142, 309, 430, 432. 
Father alleged that Mother explicitly and impliedly represented to Father that from 
March 26, 2012, she was unmarried and was only in a relationship with Father. Father and 
Mother lived together with the children as husband and wife. Father justifiably concluded 
that Mother was unmarried when each of the two children were born (G.L.H. was born 
8/23/2012 and H.H. was born 12/4/2013) and that Mother had no on-going relationship with 
Husband. R. 1, 120, 142,309,430,432. In addition, both Mother and Husband allowed 
Father to act as the children's father and develop close and intimate relationship with 
his children. Id. Husband did nothing to put Father on notice of his remarriage to Mother or 
of Husband's intent to act as a parent to Father's two children. Finally, the remarriage of 
Mother and Husband, divulged in this litigation, was a sham. Mother and Husband did not 
live together as husband and wife after their remarriage and Husband did not undertake to 
parent Father and Mother's two children Id. 
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Based thereon, Father alleged that Mother was not, for purposes of the policy behind 
the UUP A, married to Husband when the children were born. Id. Father alleges that the 
remarriage between Mother and Husband was a sham and was done only for the purpose of 
creating a legal presumption that Husband is the Father of the children. Id. Father contends 
that Mother and Husband did not maintain a husband and wife relationship after their alleged 
remarriage on August 21, 2012, two days before the birth of G.L.H. Id. Instead, Father and 
Mother have maintained a husband-wife relationship during and after Mother's pregnancy 
with the two children. Id. Accordingly, Father should be allowed to adjudicate the parentage 
of his two children under the UUP A. Id. 
Explicitly in the Amended Petition, Father claimed that "to deny [Father] of his 
paternity is a denial of his due process of law pursuant to the United States constitution and 
the Constitution of Utah." R. 309,315. In Father's memorandum in opposition to the motion 
to dismiss, he expanded his legal claims. R. 120. In summary, Father has asserted the factual 
predicates and resulting legal claims to support his standing to bring an action under the 
UUP A based on: 
1. Mother affirmatively and impliedly represented to Father that she was 
divorced from Husband as of March 26, 2012 and thereafter was only 
in a relationship with Father. Father and Mother lived together with the 
children as husband and wife. Father justifiably concluded that Mother 
was unmarried when each of the two children were born (G.L.H. born 
8/23/2012 and H.H. born 12/4/2013). Fur purposes of the policy behind 
the UUPA, Mother and Husband were not married when the two 
children were born because their re-marriage was a sham undertaken 
for the illegal purposes of deceit and misrepresentation. 
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2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
Father developed a significant and well developed relationship with the 
children as a result of deceitful, fraudulent and illegal misconduct of 
Mother and Husband, which Father has a constitutional right to protect. 
Father was explicitly and implicitly allowed by Mother and Husband to 
develop substantial and lasting relationships with the two children, that 
he admittedly fathered with Mother. 
That the denial of Father's right to adjudicate parentage under the facts 
of this case would result in a violation of Father's substantive and 
procedural due process rights under the United States and Utah 
Constitutions. 
That Utah case law allows the consideration of the unique facts of this 
case in considering the constitutionality of the UUP A and the court 
should allow the development of the facts surrounding Father's factual 
allegations and resulting claims. 
R. 1,120,142,309,430,432. 
B. The Court is to Accept, in Adjudicating a Motion to Dismiss, all 
Reasonable Factual Allegations of the Non-Moving Part and all 
Reasonable Inference Arising Therefrom. 
A motion to dismiss based upon the absence of subject matter jurisdiction is controlled 
by Rule 12(b )( 1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The Utah appellate courts have been 
clear that in adjudicating a motion to dismiss based upon the lack of subject matter 
.:V jurisdiction, the com1 is to accept the factual allegations in the petition as true and further to 
make all reasonable inferences therefrom. Energy Claims Ltd. v. Catalyst Inv. G,p. Ltd., 
2014 UT 13, iJ 46 n. 63, 325 P.3d 70, 82; Oakwood Vil!. LLC v. Albertson, Inc., 2004 UT 
101, ilil 8-9, 104 P.3d 1226; Atiya v. Salt Lake County, 852 P.2d 1007, 1008 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993), citing Hurst v. HighwayDep't, 16 Utah 2d 153,397 P.2d 71, 72 (1964) and Giro/a 
v. Roussille, 81 Nev. 661, 408 P .2d 918, 919 (1965) (motion to dismiss under Rule l 2(b )(I) 
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is only appropriate when lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter appears on the face of 
the pleading). Importantly, uncertainty as to the facts relevant to assessing the court's subject ~ 
matter jurisdiction will make it inappropriate to grant a motion to dismiss under rule 12(b )( 1 ). 
Mallory v. Brigham Young Univ., 2012 UT App 242,285 P.3d 1230 (Utah Ct. App. 2012); 
rev. on other grounds, Mall01y v. Brigham Young Univ., 2014 UT 27. 
The court had an obligation to accept Father's factual and legal claims as summarized 
above. Acceptance of those facts provides Father with a prima facie case for standing to 
bring an action under the UUP A. 
III: FATHER PROPERLY PRESERVED HIS CHALLENGE TO 
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE UUPA AS APPLIED TO 
THE FACTS OF THIS CASE. 
A. Father Adequately Pied the Facts and Related Legal Theories to 
Preserve his Contention that the UUPA is Unconstitutional as Applied 
to the Facts of this Case. 
The trial court held, in its final order, that Father failed to properly raise the issues 
relating to the constitutionality of the UUP A and therefore the issues were waived. R. 513 
(Addendum A). Father contends that he alleged all the factual predicates required to 
challenge the constitutionality of the UUP A as applied to the facts of this case and that the w 
legal arguments related thereto were clearly raised in the Amended Petition and in the 
memorandum in support of the motion to dismiss. R. 120, 142, 309, 430, 432. 
The case law in Utah establishes to preserve an issue for appellate review, a party 
must first raise the issue in the trial court. DeB,y v. Cascade Enters., 935 P.2d 499, 501 
(Utah 1997). That is, a trial court must be offered an opportunity to rule on an issue. Katz v. 
28 
Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 95 (Utah 1986), citing Meyer ex rel. Meyer v. Bartholomew, 690 P.2d 
558 (Utah 1984)). A trial court has the opportunity to rule if the following three requirements 
are met: ( 1) "the issue must be raised in a timely fashion;" (2) "the issue must be specifically 
raised;" and (3) a party must introduce "supporting evidence or relevant legal authority." 
Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm 'n, 945 P.2d 125, 130 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (citations and 
internal quotations omitted). The purpose of such requirements is to "put[] the judge on 
notice of the asserted error and allow[] the opportunity for correction at that time in the 
course of the proceeding." Broberg v. Hess, 782 P .2d 198, 201 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). See 
generally Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844 (Utah 1988). 
Father, in the Statement of Facts and in Point II above, has set out in detail the factual 
allegations that are contained in the pleadings that are relevant to a consideration of Father's 
standing and the constitutionality of the UUP A as applied to the facts of this case. 
Additionally, Father, in the same designated portions of this brief, has cited specifically to 
the Father's constitutionality and standing arguments made before the trial court. 
Accordingly Father submits that the court's finding that the constitutionality issue had not 
been raised by Father is error. 
Father alleged specific facts relating to Mother and Husband's misconduct in 
explicitly and implicitly misrepresenting Mother's marital status to Father. Both Mother and 
Husband acted in a manner supportive of Mother's explicit and repeated misrepresentation 
to Father that she was divorced from Husband as of March 26, 2012 and that she had no on-
going relationship with her ex-husband. Father alleged specifically the facts supporting his 
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allegation that Mother and Husband's remarriage was a ploy and a sham. Further, Father 
alleged the facts supportive of the allegations that Mother and Husband, after their alleged 
re-marriage, did not live together as husband and wife and Husband did not parent the two 
children at issue in this case. R. 120, 142, 309, 430, 432. 
Thus, Father argued that the ability of Mother to employ the use of the UUP A to 
defeat Father's claim, based upon her sham remarriage, would be tantamount to rewarding 
tortious misconduct. Father's parental rights should not be defeated based upon Mother's 
sham remarriage when Father relied on explicit representations of Mother that she was 
divorced and single, in fathering, parenting and bonding with the children at issue in this Q 
case. R. 120, 142, 309, 430, 432. 
Further, the public policy behind the UUPA's limitation on putative fathers' rights to 
initiate parentage actions is not served in its application in this case. The public policy, 
adopted by the Utah legislature, recognized that "parenthood within marriage best protects 
children" and that generally the marital relationship cannot survive the presence of the 
biological father. It was because of those public policy concerns that putative fathers were 
not included in the class of persons who could challenge the presumption of paternity c;_;,, 
attendant to Mother's marital status when the child is born. Utah Code§ 78B-15-607. See 
R.P. v. K.S. W, 2014 UT App. 38, iJiJ 22-23, 320 P.3d 1084. In this case, Mother and 
Husband's re-marriage was a ploy and sham and was never intended to reflect the true 
relationship of Mother and Husband. Further, Mother and Husband's action in remarrying 
in order to defeat Father's claims was not consistent with the objectives of Utah public 
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policy. Mother and Father did not live together after their remarriage. In fact, Mother lived 
with Father. Husband did not assume parenting obligations with the children and in fact 
deferred to Father's parenting and bonding with the children. R. 120, 142, 309, 430, 432. 
There can be no serious question that all of the facts relating to Mother and Husband's 
misconduct are amply demonstrated in Father's pleadings. The same can be said of Father's 
claims relating to his standing to file an action for parentage and his claims that the UUP A 
is unconstitutional as to the facts of this case. The Amended Verified Petition explicitly 
states, in paragraph 42, that to deny Father's right to a parentage determination based upon 
the wrongful conduct of Mother and Husband resulting in Father's significant, substantial 
and well-developed relationship with the children would be a denial of his due process rights 
under the United States and Utah constitutions. R. 309, 315. 
After Mother raised the UUP A in her motion to dismiss, Father comprehensively 
addressed the standing and constitutionality issues in his memorandum in opposition to the 
motion to dismiss. R. 120. Additionally, Father filed a notice pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 
24( d) on January 30th, 2015 that he was challenging the constitutionality of Utah Code§ 78B-
15-601 et seq. R. 397. 
In Father's memorandum, he ties in his factual allegations to his standing to 
commence an action under UUPA and the unconstitutionality of the statute as applied to the 
facts of this case. Father explicitly incorporated the issues raised in R.P. v. K.S. W, 2014 UT 
App. 38, where the public policy behind the statute is discussed at length and where a 
putative father's standing and constitutional rights are discussed. Father explicitly cited the 
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opinion as to its openness to review Section 607 of the UUPA in future cases where there has 
been bonding between the putative father and the child or children. In relevant part, the 
memorandum provides: 
R. 120. 
Petitioner moves the Court for additional time to submit a memorandum on 
this issue. Because of the complexity of the issue and the stage of this 
proceeding, Petitioner requests an additional fourteen (14) days to submit a 
supplemental memorandum addressing the alternative standing argument in 
terms of the constitutional and statutory rights of a biological father generally 
and the Petitioner specifically under the facts of this case in which the 
Respondent misrepresented material facts to the Petitioner and clearly engaged 
in tortious conduct. Allowing a mother to deceive and mislead a man that is 
the biological father of her children as to her marital status, living 
arrangements and other material facts and thereby rob him of his parental 
rights would turn the relevant statute on its head and violate meaningful and 
established public policy and prior interpretations of the constitution. 
A statute that was intended to prevent children from becoming wards of the 
State cannot be used as a vehicle to stripe legitimate parental and constitutional 
rights from an innocent father. The Court's determination in RP v. KSW, 2014, 
UT App. 38, explicitly excluded any consideration of the delineated 
constitutional issues: 
Although constitutional considerations might require further analysis 
in cases such as this-where the alleged father has an established 
relationship with the child-R.P. has not raised a constitutional 
challenge in the district court or on appeal. Accordingly, we leave for 
another day the issue of the constitutional implications of the UUPA's 
standing limitations where the alleged father has an established 
relationship with the child ..... Id. 
In this case, the Petitioner has an established relationship with the children and 
the Respondent and therefore, is entitled to address the relevant constitutional 
issues arising therefrom. Petitioner contends that the statute is facially 
unconstitutional and is unconstitutional as applied to him. RP v. KSW, 2014, 
UT App. 38, fn 14. 
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Father submits that he in fact preserved all of the issues discussed about related to his 
standing to bring this action and the constitutionality of the UUPA as applied to the facts of 
this case. Accordingly, the recommendation of Judge McVey, and order of Judge Johnson 
affirming the same, should be reversed and the matter remand for consideration of the factual 
and legal issues attendant to Father's standing and claims relating to the constitutionality of 
the UUPA as applied to the facts of this case. 
B. Father Should Have Been Given Additional Time to Conduct Discove,y 
and Hone his Legal Theories Relating to Standing and the 
Unconstitutionality of the UUPA as it Relates to the Facts of this Case. 
In response to Mother's motion to dismiss, Father explicitly asked for the com1 to 
strike the bald unsubstantiated factual allegations contained in the memorandum in support 
of the motion to dismiss. R. 120, 130. Father further asked for the right to conduct reasonable 
discovery related to the relevant factual issues and a continuance of any hearing on the 
motion to dismiss until discovery could be completed. R. 120, 13 I. Father explicitly asked 
for the right to conduct discovery related to the purported divorce and remarriage of Mother 
and Husband. Specifically, Father requested the right to conduct discovery as to whether 
Mother and Husband cohabited after allegedly remarrying and if so, during what time 
periods. Additionally, evidence was relevant as to the relationship of Father and Husband 
with the children. Id. Counsel for Father filed a Rule 56(-f) affidavit on October 7, 2014, 
requesting a reasonable time to conduct discovery before a hearing was held on the motion 
to dismiss. R. 240. 
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Father submits he had a right, after the filing of the motion to dismiss, to gather 
evidence related to the factual and legal issues raised by the motion. Father then would have 
an opportunity to hone his legal arguments based upon the evidence produced. The court in 
Energy Mgmt. Servs., L.L.C. v. Shaw, 2005 UT App 90, 110 P.3d 158, in the context of a 
summary judgment motion, noted that rule 56(f) motions opposing a summary judgment 
motion on the ground that discovery has not been completed should be granted liberally 
unless they are deemed dilatory or lacking in merit. Id. il 10. See also Salt Lake County v. 
Western Dairymen Coop., Inc., 2002 UT 39, ii 24, 48 P.3d 910. Although rendered in a 
summary judgment context, the same rationale should be applied to a motion to dismiss. In Q 
addition, because the trial court relied on the unsubstantiated statements in Mother's 
memorandum, which were outside the pleadings, this converted the motion into a motion for 
summary judgment. Rule l 2(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that if matters 
outside the pleadings are considered on a motion under Rule l 2(b )( 6), the motion is 
converted into a motion for summary judgment. A motion to dismiss for lack of standing is 
a Rule l 2(b )( 6) motion. See Gregory v. Shurtleff, 2013 UT 18, ii 19, 299 P .3d 1098, 1106. 
Where matters outside the pleadings are considered, the trial court must allow an opportunity G 
to respond to those additional matters. Tuttle v. Olds, 2007 UT App 10, ii 8, 155 P.3d 893, 
897. 
Where, as here, the trial court did not rule on the rule 56(f) motion, the appellate court 
considers the rule 56(f) application de nova. See Crossland Sav. v. Hatch, 877 P.2d 1241, 
1243 n.4 (Utah 1994). The court in Energy Mgmt. Servs., L.L. C. v. Shaw, 2005 UT App 90, 
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110 P.3d 158, stated that it is error for a trial court to grant summary judgment without 
addressing a pending rule 56( f) motion, absent an indication from the record that the motion 
is meritless or dilatory on its face. Id. ii 10. Accordingly, "[ w ]hen a rule 56(f) motion is not 
meritless or dilatory on its face, the moving party has 'squarely invoked the discretion of the 
district court' and the matter must be reversed and remanded for consideration on the merits." 
Id. 
When Mother filed her motion to dismiss, Father was grappling with the revelation 
that Mother alleged that she had remarried Husband behind Father's back. Father was trying 
to reconcile the fact that Mother, while living with Father and raising their two children, had 
surreptitiously engaged in a sham marriage ceremony with her ex-husband. Father filed his 
response to the motion to dismiss based upon his belief that Mother was single when the two 
children were born. Mother, in the memorandum in support of the motion to dismiss alleged 
she had remarried but failed to attach any documentation or even submit an affidavit attesting 
to the fact. 
Further, Husband was not a party to the action and Mother's motion to dismiss did not 
contain or reference any statements from Husband as to the alleged re-marriage and whether 
he contended that he was living with Mother and raising the children identified in this matter. 
It was Father who sought and obtained the right to name Husband in the action. Husband 
filed a tardy answer to the Amended Verified Petition on January 9, 2015. R. 358 The 
hearing on the motion to dismiss was conducted on January 22, 2015, thirteen days later. 
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Father had no opportunity to engage in any discovery although he had formally asked for that 
right. R. 120, 240. 
Father submits that additional discovery on the issues related to the alleged remarriage 
of Mother and Husband is important. It would have allowed Father to document and 
substantiate his claim that the remarriage was a sham and hoax and that Mother had 
intentionally misrepresented her marital status and relation with Husband to Father, who 
justifiably relied thereon. Additional discovery would have established the deep bonding that 
occurred between Father and the children and the acquiescence of Mother and Husband 
thereto. The discovery would have allowed Father to hone his legal arguments relating to 6' 
standing and the constitutionality of the relevant provisions of the UUP A. 
If the Court finds any defect in Father's efforts to preserve the arguments relating to 
his standing and the constitutionality of the UUPA as applied to the facts of this case, Father 
requests that this Court determine that Father's rule 56(f) request to conduct discovery was 
not meritless or dilatory and therefore mandates the reversal of the court's order with 
instructions to allow the requested discovery before adjudicating the motion to dismiss. 
IV: FATHER HAS ESTABLISHED A PRIMA FACIE SHOWING 
THAT HE HAS STANDING TO MAINTAIN THIS ACTION 
ANDTHATTHERELEVANTPORTIONSOFTHEUUPAARE 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED TO THE FACTS OF THIS 
CASE. 
The facts of this case establish that Mother repeatedly represented to Father that she 
was divorced as of March 26, 2012, the date of the decree she showed to Father. Mother not 
only continued to represent to Father, by her actions and words, that she was single and 
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considered herself to be in a monogamous relationship with Father; but also, that Father 
should assume full paternal control of the children and continue to develop his relationship 
with them. Mother never advised Father that she had covertly re-married her exhusband on 
August 22, 2012, one day before giving birth to Father and Mother's first child. Instead, 
Mother lived with Father, both before and after the reman-iage, and exhibited all the conduct 
consistent with an ongoing monogamous relationship. Mother never lived with her Husband 
after the re-marriage. The re-marriage was clearly a sham perpetrated to defraud and mislead 
Father. Father as a result participated in the conception of the second child and the rearing 
of both children during their entire lives up until this action was filed. 
Importantly, Husband was complicit in the tortious misconduct of Mother. Husband 
reman-ied Mother but never advised Father of the marriage or took any steps to establish, 
protect and preserve his marital relationship with Mother. Husband acquiesced and thereby 
supported Father in his parenting of the children and "marital" relationship with Mother, then 
Husband's wife. 
Accordingly Father submits that his parental rights and the right to establish his 
paternity of his two children should not be negated by the fact that Mother went through a 
sham man-iage that was never to have any real substance or affect. Father exercised 
reasonable reliance in requiring Mother to provide him with a copy of the decree of divorce 
and then continuing to father children and parent the same with Mother. Father simply had 
no way to protect his parental rights. He did not know Mother was re-married and could not 
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possibly have then modified his behavior based thereon. Father reasonably believed he was 
parenting two children with a single women. 
A. Father Has a Fully Vested Constitutional Right as the Parent of the 
Two Children. 
Father submits that the determination of his constitutional parental rights should be 
made on the assumption that Mother was in fact single when the two children, conceived 
with Mother, were born. Father cannot be held to a standard that makes him responsible for ~ 
Mother and Husband's tortious and improper conduct described herein. With that said, the 
Utah Supreme Court has defined the constitutional rights of an unwed biological father. 
In T.M. v. B.B. (In re Adoption of T.B.), 2010 UT 42, 232 P .3d I 026, the Utah 
Supreme Court stated that the guarantee of due process recognizes only "an inchoate interest" 
of an unwed biological father. Id. ,I 31 n.19. However, the court concluded that the interest 
rises to the level of a fundamental right "when [the father] 'demonstrates full commitment 
to the responsibilities of parenthood by [ coming] forward to participate in the rearing of his <..; 
child."' Id. (second alteration in original). 
The court reiterated a similar standard in In re Adoption of Baby Girl T., 2012 UT 78, 
291 P .3d 215. In that case, the court explained that"[ u ]nder both federal and state law, an 
unwed biological father has an inchoate interest in a parental relationship with his child that 
acquires full constitutional protection only when he demonstrates a full commitment to the 
responsibilities of parenthood by [ coming] forward to participate in the rearing of his child." 
Id. ii 18 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Bolden v. Doe (In 
reJ.S.), 2014 UT 51. 
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In this case, Father demonstrated full commitment to the responsibilities of 
iii} parenthood and fully participated in the rearing and support of the children. Therefore, in 
reviewing the due process claims of Father, the Court should adjudge that Father was entitled 
to full constitutional protection. 
B. Both the U.S. and Utah Constitutions Guarantee Father Due Process 
Protection. 
The Due Process Clause of both the Utah and United States Constitutions have been 
construed to encompass both a procedural and a substantive component. Under the 
procedural component, the courts have long recognized a general right to notice and an 
opportunity to be heard. See United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260,272, 
130 S. Ct. 1367, 176 L. Ed. 2d 158 (201 O); Long v. Ethics & Discipline Comm. of the Utah 
Supreme Court, 2011 UT 32, ii 29, 256 P.3d 206. Thus, for rights the law deems subject to 
fonnal process (in courts or other adjudicative bodies), due process requires notice 
~ reasonably calculated to infonn parties that their rights are in jeopardy, see Mullane v. Cent. 
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S. Ct. 652, 94 L. Ed. 865 (1950); Jackson 
Constr. Co. v. Marrs, 2004 UT 89, ii 10, 100 P.3d 1211, and a meaningful opportunity to be 
heard in the course of such proceedings. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2517, 180 
L. Ed. 2d 452(2011 ); Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, il 68, 100 P .3d 1177; Wells v. Children's 
Aid Soc. of Utah, 68 I P.2d 199, 204 (Utah 1984) (explaining that procedural due process 
requirements encompass the "notice and opportunity to be heard" that "must be observed in 
~ order to have a valid proceeding affecting life, liberty, or property") ( emphasis added). 
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The Utah Supreme Court has determined the standard of scrutiny under the federal 
and state Due Process Clauses is a deferential standard of arbitrariness. Bolden v. Doe (In re G 
J.S.), 2014 UT 51,, 49, cert. denied, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 5403 (2015). In T.M. v. B.B. (In re 
Adoption of T.B.), 2010 UT 42, iJil 28, 41, 232 P .3d 1026, the court held that because the 
biological father "could have complied with the statutory scheme established by the Utah 
Legislature for acquiring the right to withhold consent to an adoption," the father could not 
maintain a successful due process argument. Similarly, in In re Adoption of Baby Girl T., 
2012 UT 78,291 P.3d 215, the court stated that an "unmarried biological father" must only 
"be given an adequate opportunity to comply with the statutory requirements of the Adoption ~ 
Act in order to assert" a fundamental interest in his parental rights. Id. ii 19 ( citation, 
brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted). Simply, if a provides a statute provides a 
"meaningful chance" for the father to protect his interests, "he may not complain of the 
tennination of his interest when he fails to strictly comply with its procedures." Id., 20. 
C. Father was Denied his Due Process Rights in this Case. 
A biological father of a child in Utah has the right to bring an action to determine his 
parentage and for orders related to that determination, if the mother is not married when the G.;; 
child is bom.3 Utah Code § 75B-l 5-602 (2008). 
3Utah Code § 78B-15-602 (2008) provides in relevant part:"[s]ubject to Part 3, 
Voluntary Declaration of Paternity Act, and Sections 788-15-607 and 78B- l 5-609, a 
proceeding to adjudicate parentage may be maintained by: (I) the child; (2) the mother of Q 
the child; (3) a man whose paternity of the child is to be adjudicated . ... ) Emphasis 
added. 
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In an adoption scenario, the consent of an unmarried biological father is required if, 
before the time the mother executes consent for adoption or relinquishes the child for 
adoption, the father: (a) initiates proceedings under the UUPA; (b) files with the court that 
is presiding over the paternity proceeding a prescribed sworn affidavit; (c) files notice of the 
commencement of paternity proceedings; and (d) offers to pay and does pay, during the 
pregnancy and after the child's birth, a fair and reasonable amount of the expenses incurred 
in connection with the mother's pregnancy and the child's birth. Utah Code§ 78B-6-121 et 
seq. 
Only when the child is born while the mother is married, establishing a statutorily 
defined "presumed father," is the biological father precluded from any viable mechanism to 
protect his constitutionally protected parental rights. See Utah Code § 78B-l 5-602, 607 
(2008); R.P. v. K.S. W, 2014 UT App 38,136,320 P.3d 1084, 1097; J.L.C. v. KA.A., 2014 
UT App 245, 17,337 P.3d 1069, 1071. 
Under nonnal circumstances a biological father would know or could have undertaken 
effective steps to discover whether the women he was involved with was married. In this 
case, Father did not know Mother was married. In fact, Father undertook reasonable steps 
to insure Mother was single by obtaining a decree of divorce evidencing that fact. Further, 
Father's reliance on Mother being single was a result of Mother and Husband's explicit and 
overt conduct in lying and misrepresenting the marital status of Mother to Father and 
covering up the sham re-marriage. 
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Because Father had no steps that he could have reasonably taken to discover that 
Mother had re-married and Father's perception that Mother was single was based on Mother 
and Husband's tortious misconduct, Father was deprived of any mechanism to protect his 
rights and, therefore, section 607 of the UUPA is unconstitutional as applied to the facts of 
this case. 
D. A Finding that Section 607 of the UUPA is Unconstitutional as Applied 
to the Facts of this Case is not Contrary to the Policy Behind the 
Statute. 
As noted in R.P. v. K.S. W., 2014 UT App 38, 320 P.3d 1084, the court expressly 
reserved the right to review the constitutionality of section 607 of the UUPA, where the " 
alleged father "has an established relationship with the child." Id. 1 7. In this case, Father 
has established a long term relationship with the children where he has been firmly 
established, by Mother and Husband, as the children's father. Therefore, even absent the 
wrongful conduct of Mother and Husband purporting to establish that Mother was single, the 
established relationship between Father and the children warrants a consideration of the 
statute's constitutionality. 
In addition, the Utah legislature departed from the model act and removed the right Q 
of a putative father to challenge the "presumed father" status under the UUPA (section 607) 
based upon three basic public policy considerations. First, that "parenthood within marriage 
best protects children;" second, that the "unstated presumption about marriage is that the 
marital relationship could not survive the presence of the biological father;" and third, Utah's 
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common law encouraged "the [presumed] father to stay married to the child's mother and to 
assume parental responsibility for the child." R.P. v. K.S. W., 2014 UT App 38,123, 1092-93. 
In this case, the re-marriage between Mother and Husband was a sham. Mother and 
Husband did not "date" before the remarriage. The remarriage was done a day before she 
gave birth to Father's child. Mother and Husband never lived together as husbnd and wife 
in a real marriage relationship. Critically, Husband never replaced Father as the paternal 
influence in the children's lives. 
Because a finding that section 607 of the UUP A is unconstitutional does not interfere, 
in this case, with the policies behind the statute, there is an added reason to find that the 
Father's essential constitutional rights were violated in this case,justifying the reversal of the 
court's order in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
The order of the court dismissing this case should be reversed. The Court should 
declare Utah Code § 78B-l 5-607 unconstitutional to the extent it prohibits a father with an 
established parent-child relationship from maintaining rights as a parent, or alternatively the 
case should be remanded with directions to detennine whether the marriage of Mother and 
Husband was a sham or whether there are other reasons (including the deceit of Mother and 
Husband) to allow Father to prove his parentage of the children and to exercise his rights as 
a parent. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
75 East 80 North, Suite 202, American Fork, UT 84003 
EMMANUEL NUNO, 
Petitioner, 
V. 
KIMBERLY LANE HART, 
and 
BRIAN J. HART, 
Respondent. 
AMENDED ORDER ON MOTION TO 
DISMISS PETITION FOR PATERNITY 
(Hearing Date: January 22, 2015) 
Civil No. 144100205 
Judge Christine Johnson 
Commissioner Thomas R Patton 
THIS MATTER came before the court on January 22, 2015, on Respondents' Motion to 
Dismiss Petitioner's Petition for Paternity. The Petitioner appeared and was represented by Don 
R. Petersen. The Respondents appeared and were represented by Yaiko Osaki Carranza. Based 
on the evidence presented, and good cause appearing, the Court enters the followings Findings 
and Orders: 
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FINDINGS 
I. Policy. The Court states that if the marriage is intact now, and the Harts are 
treating the children as their own, the policy is that you do not break up that 
family. (20.25). Petitioner could have avoided all of that by marrying her, and 
he chose not to (20.39). The policy of the legislature is to not break up 
families, but to encourage families to stay together (20.56). The Court states 
that said policy is found in a Utah Supreme Court case on this very issue in 
which a child was born during the matTiage, and Wife then later leaves 
marriage to live with the biological father of the child, and the court still gave 
the child to the presumptive father, and not to the biological father, even 
though the Wife had by then left and had gone with the biological father of the 
child (21.11). Judge Mc Vey could not recall the name of the case, but stated 
that that this was a Supreme Court case with a 4 to] decision, with Justice 
Durham dissenting, and that it cited the Schoolcraft case. (21.56). (The case 
the Court was referring to is Pearson v. Pearson, Utah Supreme Court, 
Docket No. 20060563, Decided March 18, 2008). 
2. Judge Mc Vey states that the policy of the state is to preserve marriages, and if 
you have an interloper coming into the marriage, even though he is the 
biological father, that could create tension and confusion for the child (22.17). 
3. Constitutionality of statute. Judge Mc Vey enquires from Petitioner whether 
he is asking him to find U .C.A. § 78B-15-607 unconstitutional, and Petitioner 
answers affirmatively (25 .40). The Court enquires if Petitioner has given 
2 
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notice to the attorney general (25.50). Petitioner states that he does not know 
whether or not that is necessary (25.55). Judge Mc Vey states that he believes 
that if Petitioner wants to raise the constitutionality of a statute, he is required 
to inform the Attorney General, and that is something that would have to be 
done (28.33). 
4. The Court notes that in the matter of R.P. v K.S.W, 2014 UT App 38, the 
Court of Appeals stated that the Utah Uniform Parentage Act (UUPA) is 
preemptive common law on the issue of standing, and that it limits standing to 
the husband and wife (38.26). The Court states that Petitioner has argued that 
constitutional requirements might require further analysis, Judge McVey 
states that he is not sure why, since state legislatures have a significant interest 
in marriage and the relationship between marriage and children (38.44). Even 
though the federal government might be trying to intervene in that issue; but 
ultimately, this has always been a decision for states to decide and that is what 
the state legislature has done in this case (39.06). 
ORDERS 
5. Standing. Under Section U.C.A. §788-15-607 the Legislature has limited 
standing to the husband and wife during whose marriage the child was born. 
This is also supported by the case of R.P. v KS. W., 2014 UT App 38. (39.20). 
Therefore, under the statute, the Petitioner in this case has no standing to bring 
a challenge to paternity (39.51 ). 
6. Constitutionality of Statute. The Court recognizes that Petitioner states that he 
3 
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has an established relationship with the child, and that he is entitled to address 
the relevant constitutional issues, and that the statute is facially 
unconstitutional and unconstitutional as applied ( 40.04). But, there is no 
provision of the constitution referred to ( 40.25). Petitioner stated today that it 
is the Due Process clause ( 40.27). Judge Mc Vey states that it might be the 
Substantive Due Process Clause of the federal constitution (40.33). The Court 
is not sure that It would go so far as to intervene in a parent child relationship 
of this nature ( 40.44). 
7. Judge Mc Vey states that the issue was never raised in a manner that would 
give enough notice to the Respondent to indicate precisely how it is facially 
unconstitutional, or unconstitutional as applied. ( 40.51) 
8. For the above reasons, the Court concludes that the constitutional issue has 
not been property raised at this point. It has been waived at this point. 
(41.10). 
9. The Court recommends that that the case be dismissed for lack of standing 
under the Uniform Parentage Act. (41.38). 
10. Judge Mc Vey indicates that he is sitting as a commissioner, covering 
Commissioner Patton's calendar. ( 41.51 ). The Court states that he believes 
Petitioner may object to this recommendation, and probably go to Judge 
Johnson and have her take another bite at the apple. But she may or may not 
agree with me. (42.13). 
11. As to the issue of Attorney's Fees, the Court states that even though 
4 
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Respondents have substantially prevailed, Respondents have to file an 
Affidavit of Attorney's Fees, so that Petitioner may respond to those. (43.57). 
Order becomes effective on the date when electronically signed 
hv the Court on the first page. 
5 
000517 
NOTICE TO PETITIONER'S ATTORNEY 
TO: DON R. PETERSEN 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned, attorney for Respondents, will submit the above 
and foregoing Amended Order on Motion to Dismiss Petition for Paternity to the Fourth District 
Court for signature, upon the expiration of five (5) days from the date of this Notice, plus three 
(3) days for mailing, unless written objection is filed prior to that time, pursuant to Utah 
R.Civ.P.7(f)(2). 
Dated April 22nd , 2015. 
Isl Y aiko Osaki Carranza 
Y AIKO OSAKI CARRANZA 
Attorney for Respondents 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a member or and/or employed by the law firm of Moody Brown 
Law, 2525 North Canyon Rd., Provo, Utah 84604, and that in said capacity and pursuant to Rule 
5(b ), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a true and correct copy of the foregoing AMENDED 
ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION FOR PATERNITY was served upon the 
following on this 22nd day of April, 2015: 
Don Petersen 
X 
7 
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e-Filing (UCJA Rule 4-503) 
U.S. Regular Mail 
Facsimile Transmission 
E-Mail 
Isl SH 
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Addendu1n B 
Transcript of Po1iions of the January 22, 2015 Hearing (Rec 448) 
Emannuel Nuno 
January 22, 2015 Hearing Transcript 
Judge: Thank you. Please be seated. This is on a Motion to Dismiss its in The Lane v. Hart case. 
Case No. 144100205. Would counsel please state your appearances. 
DRP: Don Petersen on behalf of the petitioner your honor who is present in court. 
Y: Yaiko Carranza, I represent the respondents Kimberly and Brian Hart. 
~ J: Thank you. You can go ahead with your argument. 
DRP: Your honor before we do that, this matter was before the court on November 12, 2014. 
I was instructed to prepare an order. I prepared an order and submitted it to counsel and then I am 
informed today, that she objects to paragraph 4 of that order. 
J: That's not before me today the only thing I am prepared on is a Motion to Dismiss. Ifthere is an 
order out of the Commissioner's court, you should probably take that before the Commissioner. 
DRP: I agree, but it is premature to be arguing about these things because at that time, the Court said 
we need to have an indispensable party before the court. We amended the petition. We brought Mr. 
Hart in. He's been served, he has filed just a general answer. He has not participated in this Motion 
to Dismiss. 
J: Mr. Hart is the father ....... 
Vaiko: He is the husband of Ms. Kimberly Hart. I could redo my Motion to dismiss. It would be 
the same argument. 
J: I don't think you have the standing. Wei) let's ask him. Mr. Hart, do you object to going forward 
today? 
Mr. Hart: No. 
DRP: It wouldn't make any sense He's not part of this motion. lt would be granted to her, but not 
to him. 
J: He has agreed to be bound by the ruling of the court. So we will go ahead. 
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J: Ok. Just let me take a look here. Did the Commissioner say to bring this before him? It was 
scheduled before him. I do believe that he thought he had authority in this case. 
Vaiko: Y cs it was scheduled before him. 
J: I just want to review this RP case again. I picked this up late today and didn't have a thorough 
chance to look at it. I just skimmed over it. 
I would note that the Court of Appeals did say in the RP case that the uniform parentage act is 
preempted the common law the issue of standing. That it limits standing to the husband and wife. 
As Mr. Petersen pointed out that constitutional requirements might require further analysis. I'm not 
sure why the state legislatures have significant interest in marriage and the relationship with children. 
The federal government is trying to stick it's nose in there and intervene, but that is ultimately, as 
it states in the case 1 do believe that under Section 607 that would be 78B 15607 at 38, the legislature 
has limited, as it states in the case we were just referring to RP v. KSW 2014, Utah ap., The 
legislature has limited standing to the husband and wife during whose marriage the child was born 
and so under the statute, the petitioner in this case does not have standing to bring a challenge to the 
paternity. 
The other issue here is whether there's any constitutional claim that's been properly raised. I do 
recognize that the petitioner states he has an established relationship with the child and is entitled 
to address the relevant constitutional issues and he contends the statute is faciaHy unconstitutional 
as the constitution is applied, but there is no provision of the constitution. Mr. Petersen has stated 
today, it is a due process clause and I think it would more than likely be the substantive due process 
clause of the Federal constitution which may or may 11ot apply to state legislatures. I'm not sure 
whether it would go so far as to intervene in a parent-child relationship of this nature. 
I don't believe that was ever really raised in a manner that would give enough notice to the 
respondent to indicate precisely how it is facially unconstitutional and for that reason, I am going to 
conclude that the constitutional issue has not been properly raised at this point, it's been waived at 
this point, I'm not saying there aren't some mechanisms so you can get that back in this case. 
It may be or you could go before Judge Johnson on that. This is a recommendation because I am 
sitting as a Commissioner. I am going to recommend that the case be dismissed for lack of standing 
under the uniform parentage act. That would be the ruling. 
DRP: Just to clarify, do you indicate that you arc sitting as a commissioner? 
J: That is correct. I just found out about this a couple of hours ago. I am not willing at this point to 
go beyond that. I am basically covering Commissioner Patton's calendar today. 
Yaiko: Just lo clarify that means that he can o~jcct? 
J: As far as I know. I'm not the expert on the Commissioner's procedures, but as far as I know, he 
can object. ThaCs the order of the court until it's changed by someone else. He can go to Judge 
Johnson and have her take another bite at the apple here but I don't know that she may or may not 
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agree with me you would have to see. So that will be the ruling of the court. Would you prepare an 
order to that effect? 
Vaiko: Yes I will. Just one other procedural issue. We have a hearing on the 28 of January. 
believe that hearing should be stricken since the Commissioner has ordered. 
J: On the 28th of January? 
Y: Yes, next Wednesday. 
J: Unless Judge Johnson changes this ruling before then, we could continue it out to a tentative date 
maybe in March or something. 
Vaiko: Can we continue without date at this point sir? 
J: I hate to continue things without date but r don't think you will let this languish. I am sure you 
are going to do something on this right Mr. Petersen. So we don't need to set another date at this 
point. We will go ahead and do that until you are ready. We will just strike that hearing Monday, 
Tuesday, Wednesday? since its moot at this point temporarily at least. 
Yaiko: As to my request for attorneys fees sir? 
J: You will have to go through the procedure of showing that your client, even though you have 
substantially prevailed, in divorce cases, don't we have to compare the parties' income to see who 
can and cannot pay? I think. So you will probably have to file an affidavit and submit it stating what 
your client's financial situations and they can respond with theirs and it can be acted upon then. 
Maybe it can al1 be decided if it goes before Judge Johnson it can all be decided at the same time. 
Does that make sense? I want you to do a proper affidavit under rule l 03 or whatever the 
commissioner rule is and Rule 73. Thank you all. 
C:\Oocumcnts and Scttings\johnson\l.ocal Scttings\Tcmporary Internet Filcs\OLK3C\20150122 Hearing Transcript. wpd 
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AddendumC 
Ruling and Order on Petitioner's Objection to Co1nmissioner' s 
Recommendations, dated March 4, 2015 (Rec 427) 
FILED 
MAR O 4 2015 
4TH DISTR\JAA / 
STATE OF Lio/AH 
UTAH COUNTY 
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
EMMANUEL NUNO, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
KIMBERLY HART LANE, 
Respondent. 
RULING AND ORDER ON 
PETITIONER'S OBJECTION 
TO COMMISSIONER'S 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Civil No. 144100205 
Date: March 4, 2015 
Judge Christine S. Johnson 
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner's Objection to 
Commissioner's Recommendations, filed on January 30, 2015. Respondent's 
response was received on February 25, 2015. Petitioner submitted the objection 
to the Court that same day, requesting a hearing. Having reviewed the record, 
and being familiar with the governing law and applicable rules, the Court now 
denies Petitioner's objection, based upon the following: 
Petitioner's request is based upon Rule 108, which addresses domestic 
practice before commissioners. The rule provides that "[a] recommendation of 
a court commissioner is the order of the court until modified by the court. A 
party may file a written objection to the recommendation within 14 days after 
the recommendation is made[.]" URCP 108(a). The rule further contemplates 
Page 1 of 2 
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that parties may request a hearing on their objection ( URCP 108(d)), or a judge 
may schedule a hearing sua sponte (URCP 108(e)). 
The order to which Petitioner objects was made following oral 
arguments on a motion to dismiss on January 22, 2015. The record reflects that 
on that day, Commissioner Patton was ill and Judge Samuel McVey presided. 
The minute entry prepared notes that counsel did not object to the substitution 
of Judge McVey, and that "[t]he Court states that it will go forward today and 
Mr. Hart will be bound by the ruling of the court." Thus, it is clear that the 
parties were provided with an opportunity to reschedule the hearing and 
present their arguments to Commissioner Patton, had they wished to do so. 
Instead, the parties elected to go forward to have their issue decided by a judge 
rather than by a commissioner. 
1his distinction is dispositive, because Rule 108 only allows for 
objections from the decisions of commissioners, not judges. Should parties take 
issue with the decision from a judge, they are provided a remedy through 
appeal. 
Based upon the foregoing, Petitioner's objection is properly denied. 
SO ORDERED~ 
This Ruling shall stand as the Order of the Court. Pursuant to Rule 7, no 
further order is required. 
DA TED this ----4-- day of March, 2015. 
BY THE COURT: 
Christine S. ]01YlSOll'.\\ 
DISTRICT COUR 
certificate of mailing is on the following page. 
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the following 
people for case 144100205 by the method and on the date specified. 
EMAIL: YAIKO O CARRANZA ycarranza@moodybrown.com 
EMAIL: DON R PETERSEN petersend@provolawyers.com 
03/04/2015 /s/ LEISHA MEDINA 
Date: 
Deputy Court Clerk 
Printed: 03/04/15 17:00:04 
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Addendun1 D 
Ruling and Order on Petitioner's Motion to Amend Order, 
dated April 30, 2015 (Rec. 499) 
misconduct by the jury, accident or surprise, newly discovered evidence, 
excessive or inadequate damages, insufficiency of the evidence, or error. See 
URCP 59(a). Additionally, Petitioner cites to Rule 52, which permits the court 
to '' amend its findings or make additional findings and may amend the 
judgment accordingly." URCP 52(b). A decision to alter or amend judgment 
lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. See College Irr. Co. v. Logan 
River & Blacksmith Fork Irr. Co., 780 P.2d 1241, 1245 (Utah 1989). 
In Petitioner's memorandum, he devotes significant time to restating 
facts which have been previously presented. He then argues that the Court 
should amend its prior judgment, relying upon prior error as grounds for 
amending judgment under Rule 59. Specifically, the error alleged is that Judge 
McVey was acting in the capacity of a court com.missioner, not as a judge, and 
that it was thereby proper to object to Judge McVey's order. However, this 
argument does not change this Court's previous analysis. The transcript 
attached by Petitioner confirms that at the conclusion of Judge Mc Vey' s ruling, 
he described that he believed he was sitting as a commissioner and that 
Petitioner could object, but that "[Judge Johnson] may or may not agree with 
me you would have to see." Thus, it does not appear that either party was 
given any promises that this Court would view that an objection to Judge 
Mc Vey' s ruling-a ruling offered by a district court judge-was subject to review 
by another district court judge. There simply is no procedure which would 
allow for such a review. 
Because the underlying motion to dismiss has been fully heard and 
considered, this Court declines to exercise its discretion to amend judgment 
under Rule 59. 
Based upon the foregoing, Petitioner's motion to amend judgment is 
DENIED. 
I 
I 
I 
Page 2 of 3 
000500 
SO ORDERED. 
1his Ruling shall stand as the Order of the Court. Pursuant to Rule 7, no 
further order is required. 
DATED this r;yfj day of April, 2015. 
BY THE COURT: 
certificate of mailing is on the following page. 
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the following 
people for case 144100205 by the method and on the date specified. 
EMAIL: 
EMAIL: 
Date: 
YAIKO O CARRANZA ycarranza@moodybrown.com 
DON R PETERSEN petersend@provolawyers.com 
04/30/2015 /s/ LEISHA MEDINA 
Deputy Court Clerk 
Printed: 04/30/15 09:14:40 000502 Page 1 of 1 
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AddendumE 
Utah Code§ 78B-15-602 
Utah Code 
788-15-602 Standing to maintain proceeding. 
Subject to Part 3, Voluntary Declaration of Paternity Act, and Sections 788-15-607 and 
788-15-609, a proceeding to adjudicate parentage may be maintained by: 
(1) the child; 
~ (2) the mother of the child; 
(3) a man whose paternity of the child is to be adjudicated; 
(4) the support-enforcement agency or other governmental agency authorized by other law; 
(5) an authorized adoption agency or licensed child-placing agency; 
(6) a representative authorized by law to act for an individual who would otherwise be entitled to 
..J maintain a proceeding but who is deceased, incapacitated, or a minor; or 
(7) an intended parent under Part 8, Gestational Agreement. 
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session 
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Addendum F 
Utah Code§ 78B-15-607 
Utah Code 
788-15-607 Limitation -- Child having presumed father. 
(1) Paternity of a child conceived or born during a marriage with a presumed father as described in 
Subsection 788-15-204(1 )(a), (b), or (c), may be raised by the presumed father or the mother at 
any time prior to filing an action for divorce or in the pleadings at the time of the divorce of the 
VB parents. 
(a) If the issue is raised prior to the adjudication, genetic testing may be ordered by the tribunal in 
accordance with Section 788-15-608. Failure of the mother of the child to appear for testing 
may result in an order allowing a motherless calculation of paternity. Failure of the mother to 
make the child available may not result in a determination that the presumed father is not the 
~ father, but shall allow for appropriate proceedings to compel the cooperation of the mother. 
If the question of paternity has been raised in the pleadings in a divorce and the tribunal 
addresses the issue and enters an order, the parties are estopped from raising the issue 
again, and the order of the tribunal may not be challenged on the basis of material mistake of 
fact. 
~ (b) If the presumed father seeks to rebut the presumption of paternity, then denial of a motion 
seeking an order for genetic testing or a decision to disregard genetic test results shall be 
based on a preponderance of the evidence. 
(c) If the mother seeks to rebut the presumption of paternity, the mother has the burden to 
show by a preponderance of the evidence that it would be in the best interests of the child to 
~ disestablish the parent-child relationship. 
(2) For the presumption outside of marriage described in Subsection 788-15-204(1 )(d), the 
presumption may be rebutted at any time if the tribunal determines that the presumed father 
and the mother of the child neither cohabited nor engaged in sexual intercourse with each other 
during the probable time of conception. 
v}) (3) The presumption may be rebutted by: 
(a) genetic test results that exclude the presumed father; 
(b) genetic test results that rebuttably identify another man as the father in accordance with 
Section 788-15-505; 
(c) evidence that the presumed father and the mother of the child neither cohabited nor engaged 
~ in sexual intercourse with each other during the probable time of conception; or 
(d) an adjudication under this part. 
(4) There is no presumption to rebut if the presumed father was properly served and there has 
been a final adjudication of the issue. 
~ Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session 
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